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Individual transferable effort quotas for Italian fisheries? A 1 




In the context of transferable fishing concessions, the most well-known tool 6 
is probably the individual transferable quota, whereas the case of individual 7 
transferable effort quotas (ITEs) is much less often discussed. This study is 8 
the result of a project realized in collaboration with Italian fishery 9 
associations with the objective of valuating, in a participatory framework, 10 
the possible consequences of the introduction of ITEs. A semi-quantitative 11 
survey was carried out over a sample of key stakeholders being experts of 12 
bottom trawling fisheries in the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic Seas and the pelagic 13 
trawling fishery in the Adriatic Sea. The results and elaborations of the 14 
surveys were discussed and validated by a focus group composed of 15 
delegates of fishery associations. Two aspects were investigated: the 16 
relationships between fishing capacity (i.e. engine power and gross tonnage), 17 
fishing activity (i.e. fishing days and fishing hours), revenues, and variable 18 
costs (e.g. fuel) and the suitability of different proposals and alternative 19 
approaches for the introduction of ITEs. The participation of stakeholders 20 
allowed the building of some simple pedagogical tools based on realistic 21 
figures collected through the surveys that could be used by managers of 22 
associations, cooperatives, and producer organizations to better understand 23 
the functioning and possible consequences of ITEs schemes. 24 
 25 
Keywords: transferable fishing concessions; participative management; 26 
transferable effort quotas; Mediterranean; fishers’ behaviour. 27 
 28 
1. Introduction 29 
Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 30 
on the Common Fisheries Policy introduces the concept of 'transferable 31 
fishing concessions' (TFCs) as a revocable user entitlement to specific fishing 32 
opportunities. This scheme is included in the regulation as a voluntary 33 
approach for Member States. Importantly, in the first version of the 34 
regulation prepared by the European Commission in 2011, TFCs were 35 
mandatory for all vessels longer than 12 m. This strategy was considered 36 
optimal in order to adjust the overcapacity of EU fleets and increase fishery 37 
efficiency, but criticisms from several sources, including the Regional 38 
Advisory Council for the Mediterranean and the Italian Senate, led to a 39 
softer, voluntary regulation. 40 
However, TFCs remain a recurring theme in EU policy debates, and it is 41 
important for stakeholders to better understand their application and 42 
possible consequences in order to take an objective position. In the 43 
framework of TFCs, the most well-known tools are probably individual 44 
transferable quotas (ITQs), whereas the case of individual transferable effort 45 
quotas (ITEs) is much less discussed (MRAG et al., 2009; OECD, 2006; Squires 46 
et al., 2016, 2012). ITEs were mentioned by the European Commission in 47 
their preliminary documents on fishery policy reform, and, more precisely, 48 
they were associated with the Mediterranean case, where management is 49 
already driven by fishing effort regulation1 and where multispecificity may 50 
represent an obstacle for ITQs, inducing overquota discards (Baudron et al., 51 
2010; Ulrich et al., 2002). Furthermore, ITEs provide automatic feedback 52 
control (i.e. catch changes) when fish stocks increase or decrease, which may 53 
be more effective than ITQs at managing fishing mortality when there is a 54 
high unpredictable annual recruitment variation and short-lived species, 55 
which is the case for several Mediterranean stocks, and when biomass data 56 
is of low availability or quality (Squires et al., 2016). 57 
The introduction of TFCs (or market-like instruments, as the OECD calls them) 58 
is often met with resistance from participants in the fisheries sector. For this 59 
reason, the OECD (2006), based on several experiences, presented a list of 60 
tracks that policy makers can draw upon in meeting these challenges and 61 
                                                          
1
 Total allowable catches are not generally used in Mediterranean fisheries, with an 
exception made for tuna (Thunnus thynnus). 
that can ease the introduction and improve the design of these instruments. 62 
The first of these tracks is ‘making all stakeholders comfortable with the 63 
concept of market-like instruments’, followed by others, such as ‘preferring 64 
an incremental or gradual implementation’, ‘not necessarily adopting a one-65 
size-fits-all strategy’, and ‘involving stakeholders in the reform process’ 66 
(OECD, 2006).  67 
In this framework, this study is the result of a project realized for the Italian 68 
Ministry of Agriculture, with the active participation of three Italian fishery 69 
associations (Agci Agrital, Federcoopesca-Confcooperative, and Lega Pesca-70 
Legacoop)2 joined in the ‘Alliance of Italian Cooperatives’, with the objective 71 
of valuating the possible consequences of the introduction of ITEs. These 72 
three associations combined represent more than 1500 cooperatives 73 
involved in fisheries or aquaculture with more than 20, ,000 members who 74 
are responsible for about 80% of Italian fish production. It is very important 75 
that stakeholder associations, with the collaboration of research institutions, 76 
lead similar initiatives, fostering the participation of fishers and the 77 
dissemination of results. The main objective of the project, and the paper,  is 78 
to build, through a participative approach, a few pedagogical tools that can 79 
be used by fishers' associations to evaluate the possible effects of the 80 
introduction of ITEs. 81 
This paper follows the approach used in the project and is organized as 82 
follows. In the next chapter, we consider how ITEs have been applied in other 83 
contexts. In chapter three, we present the methodological approach used for 84 
the study. In chapter four, we illustrate the results, including the models 85 
generated from focus groups with stakeholders. Chapter five concludes the 86 
paper. Two appendices are included in order to illustrate, more formally and 87 
with simulations, some bioeconomic aspects linked to the introduction of 88 
ITEs; these tools were useful to prepare the questionnaire and the discussion 89 
with the fishery associations’ delegates. 90 
 91 
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 Administratively, this project was led by Federcoopesca-Confcooperative. 
 92 
2. Background 93 
Management schemes based on transferable fishing concessions, property 94 
rights, or market-like instruments generally assume that private forces, 95 
spontaneously, may drive economies toward maximum efficiency. The OECD 96 
and FAO (OECD, 2006) agree that these instruments have to be considered 97 
as ‘use rights’ rather than property rights. In this context, ITQs are the tools 98 
that are more studied in the literature (they were analytically considered for 99 
the first time by Christy (1973)) and more applied to the management of 100 
fisheries (applications begun in the eighties (Breen et al., 2016)). ITEs, on the 101 
contrary, have been considered less frequently (Squires et al., 2016). In the 102 
appendices, we present an analytical framework for interpreting ITEs, 103 
whereas, in the following paragraphs, we discuss some applications, 104 
especially in European waters. 105 
Squires et al. (2016, 2012) review several ITEs management approaches 106 
around the world. These approaches can be roughly classified into two 107 
groups: those where total allowable effort (TAE) is expressed as days at sea 108 
(which is closer to our interests), and those where it is expressed as the 109 
number of gears, such as pots, traps, or hooks. 110 
Among days-at-sea schemes, the Faroe Islands demersal fishery is a well-111 
known example. In the mid-1990s, the Faroe Islands rejected the TAC system 112 
that was in place, especially due to extensive discarding when single-species 113 
quotas were filled, and substituted it with a TAE scheme consisting of ITEs 114 
(fishing days) for specific fleet categories (small trawlers, pair trawlers, 115 
longliners, and coastal fishing) (Baudron et al., 2010; Jákupsstovu et al., 116 
2007). For example, due to catchability differences, one fishing day of a 117 
longliner <110 GT was equivalent to two fishing days using jigs. Since its 118 
introduction, the total number of fishing days allocated has been reduced 119 
several times, but these days have not been fully utilized, suggesting that the 120 
effort allocation is too high and is not able to reduce overcapacity and 121 
overfishing (Baudron et al., 2010; Jákupsstovu et al., 2007; Squires et al., 122 
2012).  123 
Inside the European Union, the Netherlands and Denmark have applied 124 
hybrid systems where ITEs (e.g. transferable kilowatt days) were 125 
complementary tools to support ITQs, mainly to reduce the number of 126 
fishing days and bycatches of overquota stocks (Andersen et al., 2010; MRAG 127 
et al., 2009; OECD, 2006). More interesting and easy to analyse is probably 128 
the case of the Spanish ‘300 fleet’, so called due to the number of Spanish 129 
vessels that the European Community allowed to fish in the Communitarian 130 
Atlantic EEZ when Spain entered into the Community (1986) (González Laxe, 131 
2006; MRAG et al., 2009; OECD, 2006). In fact, only 150 ‘standard vessels’ (of 132 
the 300) could fish simultaneously. The standard vessel was considered a 133 
vessel with a braking power of 700 hp, and conversion coefficients were 134 
defined for vessels with different powers. Conversion coefficients and 135 
braking power do not have a linear relationship, and, in fact, the coefficient 136 
changes less than proportionally compared with braking power, with an 137 
elasticity coefficient3 around 0.3. After 1997, firms could exchange fishing 138 
day quotas, with a minimum and a maximum number of days that could be 139 
owned. In 2007, the TAE and ITEs scheme was substituted with a TAC and 140 
ITQs scheme. 141 
The literature shows that in Spain, ITEs have been effective to reduce the size 142 
of the fleet (González Laxe, 2006; MRAG et al., 2009; OECD, 2006).  However, 143 
the parameterization of ‘standard vessels’ on the basis of braking power has 144 
caused a decrease in average power and a contemporaneous increase in 145 
average gross tonnage (GT); at the same time, the spatial distribution of 146 
vessels has changed, fostering Galicia to the detriment of the Basque 147 
country.  148 
Around the world, other ITEs schemes based on days at sea are found in New 149 
England ground fish fishery in the U.S., the Western and Central Pacific 150 
Ocean purse seine tuna fishery, and the Falkland Islands squid fishery 151 
(Squires et al., 2016, 2012). 152 
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 The elasticity coefficient is calculated as the percentage increase in the coefficient factor 
divided by the percentage increase in the braking power. 
Concerning Mediterranean countries, one study was carried out by Lucchetti 153 
et al. (2014) to compare the strengths and weaknesses of different, possible 154 
TFCs schemes, including ITQs and ITEs. Opinions were collected by several 155 
public authorities. The conclusion of the study is that TFCs would not be 156 
appropriate for the Mediterranean context (with the partial exception of 157 
pelagic fisheries). Several motivations for this conclusion are expressed, such 158 
as, in particular, the risk that smaller companies would disappear in favour 159 
of larger, economically stronger companies.  160 
 161 
3. Data and Methods 162 
3.1 Study area 163 
The objective of this study is to evaluate the possible consequences of ITEs 164 
in Italian fisheries, involving stakeholders through a participative approach. 165 
This research has focused in particular on three Italian fisheries: the Adriatic 166 
pelagic trawling fishery, the Adriatic bottom trawling fishery, and the 167 
Tyrrhenian bottom trawling fishery. The Adriatic pelagic trawling fishery 168 
incudes 127 vessels (representing around 90% of the Italian pelagic trawling 169 
fishery) with an annual production of around 41 million Euros (95% of Italian 170 
production). The two bottom trawling fisheries (Adriatic and Tyrrhenian, 171 
excluding Sicily and Sardinia) include, respectively, 1,130 and 500 vessels 172 
(48% and 21% of the Italian bottom trawling fishery), with an annual 173 
production of around 200 and 82 million Euros (48% and 20% of Italian 174 
production) (Mipaaf and NISEA, 2014). 175 
In mid-2014, a Ministerial Decree introduced a new management scheme for 176 
the Adriatic fisheries (effective for both pelagic and bottom trawling) stating 177 
that, in order to reduce fishing efforts, each vessel had to choose either i) 178 
fishing five days per week for a maximum of 72 weekly hours or ii) fishing 179 
only four days per week4. 180 
 181 
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 Fishing is always forbidden on Saturdays and Sundays in all sea areas. 
3.2 Participatory management 182 
Fishers' participation in fisheries research and management is becoming 183 
more and more common despite the strong biological/positivistic tradition 184 
in fisheries management and the high level of government involvement. 185 
Without fishers' participation in research, the ability of fisheries managers is 186 
limited and new policy decisions can lead to low compliance and tension 187 
between stakeholders and authorities (Silver and Campbell, 2005). However, 188 
there is much uncertainty on how to best elicit stakeholders’ information, 189 
objectives and options in a rigorous manner that support management 190 
decisions (Silver and Campbell, 2005). 191 
For this scope, several qualitative or semi-quantitative approaches have 192 
been applied and can be found in fisheries literature. Martin-Smith et al. 193 
(2004) developed an ad hoc iterative process of consultation for the 194 
development of management options. Other tools are more focused on 195 
research questions rather than management objectives and include semi-196 
structured interviews (Trimble et al., 2014), participatory problem-solution 197 
trees (Manrique de Lara and Corral, 2017), excursions, seasonal calendars, 198 
historical timelines (Glaser et al., 2015), rapid rural appraisal techniques 199 
(Pido, 1995), experimental field games (Cleland, 2017), etc. 200 
 201 
3.3 Methodology 202 
For this study, a semi-quantitative approach has been used. Consultation 203 
with fishers occurred at two different points. First, at the beginning of 2016, 204 
a survey was conducted with 38 key stakeholders distributed in sixteen ports 205 
of eight Italian regions along the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian coasts (Figure 1). 206 
Key stakeholders were chosen by ‘Alliance of Italian Cooperatives’ experts 207 
mainly among vessel owners or captains that also have (or had) formal roles 208 
inside local cooperatives or producer organizations (normally, one or more 209 
cooperatives can be found in every port). In fact, the information collected 210 
is not directly related to the fishery activity of key stakeholders but on their 211 
own knowledge (as experts) of regional patterns. Second, the results and 212 
elaborations of the surveys were discussed and validated in a focus group 213 
composed of ten delegates of the fishery associations (Agci Agrital, 214 
Federcoopesca-Confcooperative, and Lega Pesca-Legacoop) at the regional 215 
(six delegates for Tuscany, Apulia, Emilia-Romagna, Abruzzo, Calabria and 216 
Sicily) and national (four delegates) level. 217 
For the survey, eleven stakeholders (from three regions) were interviewed 218 
for the Adriatic pelagic fisheries; fifteen (from five regions) for the Adriatic 219 
bottom trawling fisheries, and twelve (from three regions) for the Tyrrhenian 220 
bottom trawling fisheries. These key stakeholders were consulted about 221 
their opinions on: 222 
a) The relationships between fishing capacity (i.e. engine power and GT), 223 
fishing activity (i.e. fishing days and fishing hours), revenues, and 224 
variable costs (e.g. fuel) (for a formal treatment see appendix A). 225 
b) The suitability of different proposals and alternative approaches for 226 
the introduction of ITEs. 227 
The first part of the survey is important in order to understand the 228 
relationships among the variables normally used to estimate production 229 
functions, in particular how capacity affects activity, revenues, and variable 230 
costs (i.e. linearly or non-linearly) and how activity affects catches. These 231 
variables were measured by asking about the average daily revenue, daily 232 
variable cost, and yearly number of days at sea of an average vessel (given a 233 
certain GT and engine power) of a specific Italian region (the region of the 234 
person interviewed) using a specific gear (pelagic or bottom trawl). Regional 235 
reference values provided by official statistics (Mipaaf and NISEA, 2014) were 236 
communicated to the key stakeholders, and they could confirm or change 237 
them. Then, stakeholders were asked what difference in revenue, fuel cost, 238 
and days at sea should be expected for a vessel with a capacity (both GT and 239 
engine power) 20% larger and 20% smaller than the average vessel. The 240 
same procedure was followed to calculate the effect of yearly days at sea on 241 
yearly revenues.  242 
These relationships are essential in order to understand which vessels (i.e. 243 
large or small) would take advantage of the introduction of ITEs. Other 244 
questions were related to the length of an average day at sea (for which no 245 
official data exist) and the reasons that a vessel spends fewer days at sea 246 
than would be theoretically allowable. 247 
In the second part of the survey, questions addressed the stakeholders’ 248 
opinions about different aspects of ITEs, in particular: 249 
a) The introduction of non-transferable quotas (or limits) of fishing days 250 
(in the case of the Adriatic Sea something similar was already 251 
introduced by the 2014 Ministerial Decree). 252 
b) The use of weekly or monthly restrictions in the allowed fishing days. 253 
c) Different patterns in the initial allocation of fishing days (Bellanger et 254 
al., 2016). 255 
d) The introduction of transferability of fishing days. 256 
e) Different approaches to permit the transferability of fishing days 257 
between vessels of different capacities (no constraints, transferability 258 
only within classes of vessels with similar capacity, or nominal effort 259 
quotas such as capacity*day).   260 
The results and elaborations of the surveys were discussed and validated in 261 
a focus group composed of ten delegates of fishery associations at regional 262 
and national level. With the help of the delegates, starting from revenue and 263 
cost data, a generic tool to show the relationship between vessel capacity 264 
and daily value added was built for the bottom trawling fisheries. Finally, we 265 
built a simplified model indicating how the value added is distributed day by 266 
day. This model was used to discuss possible consequences of the 267 
introduction of ITEs. 268 
 269 
 270 
4. Results 271 
4.1 Survey 272 
Table 1 shows the main characteristics of the fleets per region, comparing 273 
official data (Mipaaf and NISEA, 2014) and key stakeholders’ opinions. No 274 
significant differences have been found in the daily fuel costs. Considering 275 
how stakeholders were chosen (i.e. representative key agent), the number 276 
of interviews (i.e. low compared to population of fishers), and the typology 277 
of questions (i.e. oriented to get information about standard vessels rather 278 
than specific vessels), the results of the survey must be evaluated in a 279 
qualitative (or semi-quantitative) way rather than in a pure quantitative (i.e. 280 
statistical) way. This means that relationships are validated through 281 
consultation with a set of experts (i.e. focus group) rather than statistical 282 
tests. 283 
 284 
Table 1. Daily revenues, daily fuel costs and fishing days/year per region (A: Adriatic; T: 285 
Tyrrhenian) and fishery (BT: bottom trawling; PT: pelagic trawling) of average vessels and 286 
smaller/larger vessels (i.e. GT -20% and +20% compared to average vessels). For daily revenue 287 
and fishing days, in brackets, official data (Mipaaf, Nisea, 2014); out of brackets, figures declared 288 
by stakeholders (all declared figures are the arithmetic mean of stakeholders’ answers). 289 
Region  Fishery GT average 
vessel 
(tons) 













Abruzzo (A) BT 59 1265 (1265) -20%; +20% 694 -17%; +17% 120 (152) -13%; +10% 
Campania (T) BT 34 893 (893) -20%; +10% 265 -23%; +13% 169 (169) -13%; +13% 
Emilia-
Romagna (A) 
BT 24 1210 (1415) -23%; +10% 476 -5%; +5% 110 (83) -10%; +7% 
Lazio (T) BT 50 1291 (1321) -15%; +5% 544 -10%; +5% 167.5 (199) -5%; +3% 
Marche (A) BT 57 1658 (1787) -13%; +3% 750 -10%; +13% 139 (139) -7%; +7% 
Apulia (A) BT 25 1007 (1220) -17%; +17% 435 -13%; +17% 200 (128) 0%; 0% 
Tuscany (T) BT 31 1225 (1256) -10%; 0% 499 0%; 0% 174 (153) 0%; 0% 
Veneto (A) BT 40 867 (1966) -10%; +25% 410 -10%; +10% 112 (107) 0%, 0% 
Emilia-
Romagna (A) 
PT 62 2435 (2435) -5%; +10% 619 -28%; +20% 170 (126) 0%; 0% 
Marche (A) PT 107 1602 (1602) 0%; 0% 870 -14%; +13% 163 (162) -20%; 0% 
Veneto (A) PT 68 2875 (3188) -7%; +7% 659 -7%; +20% 120 (126) -1%; +10% 
 290 
 291 
4.1.1 Effects of fishing capacity 292 
Stakeholders estimated the per cent difference between the average daily 293 
revenue and daily fuel cost of a vessel of average capacity (for every region 294 
and fishery) and those of vessels with 20% more or less capacity compared 295 
to the average vessels. The regional results are aggregated in Table 2 by sea 296 
basin and fishery. Since vessels characteristics, fishers’ strategies and 297 
available species can differ substantially even in neighbour regions, these 298 
average results should be considered with a little of caution. In general, 299 
stakeholders said that both revenues and fuel costs change less than 300 
proportionally with changes in vessel capacity. Furthermore, for Tyrrhenian 301 
bottom trawlers, the responses indicated that revenue is increasingly 302 
inelastic as capacity increases. In fact, daily revenue drops by 15% when 303 
capacity decreases and rises by only 5% when capacity increases. This fishery 304 
exhibits a similar pattern for daily fuel costs. 305 
 306 
Table 2. Daily revenues and fuel costs of standard vessels and smaller/larger vessels (data are 307 
aggregated by fishery using the arithmetic mean of regional surveys). 308 
Sea basin Fishery Capacity -20% Average vessel Capacity +20% 
  Daily revenue (€) 
Tyrrhenian Bottom trawling -15% 1136 +5% 
Adriatic Bottom trawling -17% 1201 +15% 
Adriatic Pelagic trawling -4% 2304 +6% 
  Daily fuel cost (€) 
Tyrrhenian Bottom trawling -11% 436 +6% 
Adriatic Bottom trawling -11% 553 +12% 
Adriatic Pelagic trawling -16% 716 +18% 
 309 
For Adriatic fisheries, on the contrary, the decreasing returns to capacity 310 
seem to be constant. For pelagic trawlers, revenues seem to be much more 311 
inelastic than fuel costs. This result may be due in part to the technical 312 
specificities of this fishery and certainly is due in part to the self-management 313 
habits of some cooperatives (especially in the Marche region), where 314 
voluntary daily quotas are established for all members independent of the 315 
size of the vessels. 316 
The relationships between capacity and daily fuel costs are difficult to 317 
analyse because, depending on the region, larger vessels may fish for more 318 
hours than smaller vessels, with a direct effect on fuel costs. 319 
In Figure 2, revenue and fuel cost data (i.e. stakeholders’ opinion) for all 320 
regional bottom trawling fleets (both Adriatic and Tyrrhenian) are shown. 321 
These data include the eight regional average vessels and the corresponding 322 
higher (+20%) and lower (-20%) capacity vessels (GT is indicated in the 323 
figure). From this figure, large vessels seem to have a very slight advantage 324 
compared to small vessels since the distance between daily costs and daily 325 
revenues increases with capacity. 326 
The effect of fishing capacity on fishing activity is very low (i.e. fishing activity 327 
is inelastic) (Table 3). This finding is the same if we consider both fishing days 328 
per year and fishing hours per day. Stakeholders in some regions (Apulia, 329 
Tuscany, and Veneto) say that capacity has no effect at all on the number of 330 
fishing days of bottom trawlers. Differences between regions, linked to 331 
differences in the natural environment and in social habits, are much more 332 
significant than differences between vessel sizes within regions. The average 333 
number of fishing days varies from 110 (bottom trawling in Emilia Romagna) 334 
to 200 (bottom trawling in Apulia). The average number of fishing hours 335 
varies from 11 (pelagic trawling in Veneto) to more than 20 (bottom trawling 336 
in Marche and Abruzzi).  337 
 338 
Table 3. Fishing days and fishing hours of standard vessels and smaller/larger vessels (data are 339 
aggregated by fishery using the arithmetic mean of regional surveys). 340 
Sea basin Fishery Capacity -20% Average vessel Capacity +20% 
  Fishing days / year 
Tyrrhenian Bottom trawling -6% 170 +5% 
Adriatic Bottom trawling -6% 136 +5% 
Adriatic Pelagic trawling -9% 158 +2% 
  Fishing hours / day 
Tyrrhenian Bottom trawling -5% 14.6 3% 
Adriatic Bottom trawling -1% 17.9 1% 
Adriatic Pelagic trawling -3% 13.2 6% 
 341 
4.1.2 Effects of fishing activity 342 
For most of the stakeholders, the first factor limiting the number of fishing 343 
days is weather conditions. Other reasons vary depending on the sea basin 344 
and fishery. In the case of pelagic trawling in the northern Adriatic (Veneto 345 
and Emilia Romagna), vessels remain inside the port if demand and prices 346 
are low. For Adriatic bottom trawling, stock seasonality and vessel 347 
maintenance periods are equally important in determining fishing days. 348 
In the Adriatic Sea, the application of the 2014 Ministerial Decree has not 349 
been uniform. Depending on the geographic area, fishers have preferred to 350 
either fish five days per week for a maximum of 72 weekly hours or to fish 351 
only four days per week. The ‘four days’ option has been naturally preferred 352 
in areas, such as Marche and Abruzzi, where boats are larger and can fish for 353 
more hours. 354 
All stakeholders indicated that this new rule has caused both time at sea and 355 
revenues to decrease, but the decrease in revenue of about 9% is less than 356 
proportional compared to that of time (about 13%). Adriatic fishers also said 357 
that if they could fish for the same number of days but without weekly limits, 358 
revenues would increase around 5%. Finally, if a new regulation called for a 359 
30% reduction in days at sea, Adriatic stakeholders would expect a less than 360 
proportional reduction in revenues (around 16% for bottom trawling and 361 
24% for pelagic trawling). 362 
These opinions are not shared by Tyrrhenian fishers, where fishing day limits 363 
have never been applied. In fact, when they were asked the potential effects 364 
of a 20% or a 50% reduction in days at sea, they estimated a roughly 365 
proportional revenue reduction. 366 
  367 
4.1.3 Opinions on ITEs schemes 368 
Most of the Adriatic key stakeholders, in particular those in pelagic trawling, 369 
declared that they were satisfied by the introduction of the fishing time limits 370 
imposed by the 2014 Ministerial Decree. However, fishers who adopted the 371 
72 weekly hours option would not appreciate the introduction of limits on 372 
the number of fishing days. Similarly, most of the Tyrrhenian fishers are 373 
opposed to such schemes. 374 
In the case of the introduction of fishing day limits, Adriatic stakeholders 375 
would prefer to adopt a weekly allocation (i.e. four fishing days per week), 376 
whereas Tyrrhenian stakeholders would prefer to be free to allocate fishing 377 
days throughout the whole year (i.e. no weekly or monthly limits). 378 
Stakeholders who prefer weekly limits indicated that they would allow for 379 
easier control and management; furthermore, they would be critical to allow 380 
a more regular flow of products to the markets. 381 
Most of the Adriatic stakeholders indicated that fishing day limits should be 382 
distributed equally to all vessels (as done by the 2014 Ministerial Decree) 383 
independent of vessel sizes or time series. On the contrary, on the Tyrrhenian 384 
side, opinions were less uniform, and half of the stakeholders expressed that 385 
larger vessels that currently use more fishing days would need more fishing 386 
days to recover fixed costs. 387 
Both Adriatic and Tyrrhenian fishers think that the transferability of fishing 388 
days would not be a good idea. Fishers said that larger vessels would buy or 389 
lease fishing days from smaller vessels. Smaller vessel owners would simply 390 
earn rents. Control and management would be very difficult. 391 
Finally, the responses were very diversified when different transferability 392 
schemes between vessels of different sizes were proposed. Key stakeholders 393 
representing Adriatic pelagic trawling said that no constraints should be 394 
imposed; this argument can be reasonable if it is true that large vessels have 395 
no sensible advantage over small vessels (i.e. if landings are rather inelastic 396 
to vessel capacity, as in some simulations shown in the appendix). 397 
Stakeholders in Adriatic bottom trawling said that transferability should be 398 
allowed within classes of vessels with similar capacities. Stakeholders in 399 
Tyrrhenian bottom trawling perceived all schemes as more or less equal, 400 
including ‘no constraints’, ‘capacity classes’, and ‘effort indices’ (expressed 401 
as GT*fishing days or engine power*fishing days, which permit to maintain a 402 
constant total fishing effort). 403 
  404 
4.2 Focus group 405 
The focus group permitted to validate (and discuss) the data collected in the 406 
survey. This further allowed to build, together with the fishery associations 407 
delegates, the bottom trawling model and the ITEs model that we present in 408 
the next sections. 409 
 410 
4.2.1 The bottom trawling model 411 
Starting from revenue and cost data collected through the survey (see Figure 412 
2), a generic capacity-daily value added relationship was built for the bottom 413 
trawling fisheries of the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian Seas. It is important to 414 
highlight that for every Italian region there are specificities (linked to gear 415 
differences, distributions of main and secondary species, distance, depth of 416 
fishing areas, etc.) that make our generic model only a very rough and 417 
pedagogical tool and not an instrument for developing positivistic 418 
bioeconomic models. Gross value added is used as the output variable 419 
instead of profit due to problems in the estimation of labour costs. 420 
The model (shown in Figure 3), validated by the associations delegates, has 421 
the following properties: 422 
 The daily revenue curve fits the data shown in Figure 2 with decreasing 423 
returns to capacity (expressed in GT). 424 
 Daily variable costs are derived from fuel costs, which represent 425 
approximately 76% of variable costs. The data shown in Figure 2 are 426 
used to estimate a linear relationship with a positive vertical intercept 427 
between variable costs and capacity. 428 
 The daily value added is slightly increasing.  Associations delegates 429 
indicated that the maximum daily profit is probably obtained by 430 
vessels of around 120 GT5.  431 
 432 
Fishery association delegates also confirmed that capacity has only a 433 
marginal effect on fishing days. Although large vessels may potentially stay 434 
at sea for more days, as they are less affected by weather conditions, market 435 
conditions represent a constraint that limits the actual number of fishing 436 
days. 437 
 438 
4.2.2 The ITEs model 439 
Since stakeholders confirm decreasing returns to fishing time (see appendix 440 
A), we built a simplified model indicating how the value added is distributed 441 
day by day, from the most rentable to the least (Figure 4), and we used this 442 
tool to discuss the consequences of ITEs schemes. The yearly value added 443 
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 It is important to stress that in the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian seas, there are only a few 
vessels larger than 150 GT. This is not the case for vessels fishing in waters around Sicily. 
(73,400 euro) of an average bottom trawler (40 GT) is derived in Figure 3. 444 
The number of days at sea is 150, which is an average number for the 445 
Tyrrhenian and Adriatic regions.  446 
Now, suppose that, in order to reduce pressure on fish stocks, the number 447 
of fishing days has been limited by the management authority to 120 (-20%). 448 
The effects on yearly revenues depend on two variables: i) the existence of 449 
weekly constraints (i.e. a maximum of four days per week) and ii) whether 450 
the distribution of more and less rentable days follow a seasonal pattern (i.e. 451 
all of the worst days of the year are found within the same week) or a weekly 452 
pattern (i.e. every week has a perfect distribution of good, average, and bad 453 
days). We have the following cases: 454 
 Weekly constraints and seasonal patterns of rentable days: The 455 
revenue drop (19%) is almost proportional to the drop in fishing time. 456 
In fact, fishers are not free to discard all of the worst days of the year. 457 
 No weekly constraints and seasonal patterns of rentable days: The 458 
revenue drop is very small (4%), since fishers may select and discard 459 
all of the worst days (Figure 4). 460 
 Weekly patterns of rentable days: The revenue drop is always 4%, 461 
regardless of weekly constraints. 462 
Thus, weekly constraints may affect fishers’ revenue much more than 463 
unconstrained limits, depending on the distribution of bad and good fishing 464 
days within the year. Seasonal patterns are driven by biological cycles (i.e. 465 
revenue decreases due to catch cycles), whereas weekly patterns can be the 466 
result of market forces (i.e. revenue decreases due to weekly price cycles). 467 
Focus group participants indicate that the truth is in the middle. On the other 468 
hand, stakeholders acknowledge that in the case of seasonal patterns (i.e. 469 
cycles of catches), only weekly constraints may have a significant effect on 470 
effective effort reduction, which should be the true objective of the 471 
management. 472 
 473 
Now, consider the case where there are no weekly constraints and the 474 
transferability of quotas is allowed. Several such situations were discussed 475 
with stakeholders. In Figure 5a, Vessel A is an average bottom trawler. Vessel 476 
B is more efficient than A; historically, it used the same number of fishing 477 
days, but the value added obtained was 60% higher. With the introduction 478 
of a 120-day limit, A and B have different marginal values added6. It is 479 
possible to calculate that seven days should be sold from A to B. However, 480 
this exchange increases the effective fishing effort and catches (see appendix 481 
B), which should be taken into account by the management authority. 482 
In Figure 5b, a different situation is shown. Vessel C has the same value 483 
added as B in the previous example, but C used to fish 180 days per year. The 484 
management authority must decide if the day limit has to be equal for all 485 
vessels (e.g. 150 days) or proportional to a vessel’s historic number of fishing 486 
days (e.g. 9% reduction). The two methods allow the same number of total 487 
days for the fleet. In the first case, Vessel A is not affected by the new 488 
measure. However, A will sell 16 days to C, which is strongly motivated to 489 
buy days due to its high marginal value added. This situation confirms the 490 
results of interviews, in which fishers said that a small vessel would enjoy 491 
free rents without needing to fish. In order to avoid this situation, limits 492 
proportional to a vessel’s historic number of fishing days should be adopted, 493 
a proposal that was not appreciated in the interviews. In this second case, 494 
many fewer days would be exchanged (only two); the same equilibrium 495 
would be obtained, but without rents for A. 496 
 497 
In order to avoid an increase in effort due to the exchange of day quotas, 498 
effort quotas (expressed as GT*fishing days) could be used. We have said 499 
that the value added of B is 60% higher than that of A (Figure 5a); from Figure 500 
3, due to decreasing returns to input, we can see that this situation occurs if 501 
the GT of B (80) is double that of A (40). In other words, in order to maintain 502 
a constant nominal effort quota, B should buy two days from A in order to 503 
fish one day more. However, this exchange is not worthwhile for A and B. On 504 
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 Considering the marginal value added instead of the marginal profit is as if the whole 
crew decided to sell or buy quotas. 
the contrary, it is worthwhile for A to buy one day from B in order to fish two 505 
days more. 506 
This example showed to stakeholders how an effort quota might prevent the 507 
sale of fishing days from small vessels to large vessels. However, because of 508 
the difference between nominal effort and effective effort, this measure 509 
could still cause an increase in effective effort (i.e. two days of small vessels 510 
represent more pressure than one day of large vessels) and may artificially 511 
advantage inefficient vessels (see appendix B).     512 
 513 
5. Discussion and conclusions 514 
The results of the survey show that the application of the 2014 Ministerial 515 
Decree in the Adriatic Sea has made these stakeholders more open to fishing 516 
day restrictions compared to Tyrrhenian fishers. Adriatic fishers have seen 517 
positive effects in terms of cost reductions and price increases. Furthermore, 518 
they would maintain the current conditions (i.e. weekly constraints, equal 519 
limits for everybody, and no transferability), whereas Tyrrhenian fishers, if 520 
forced to limit the number of fishing days, would prefer different conditions 521 
(i.e. no weekly constraints and different limits by vessel size). The results also 522 
indicate that Adriatic stakeholders acknowledge a less than proportional 523 
drop in revenues due to a decrease in fishing time (indicating decreasing 524 
returns to fishing time). On the contrary, Tyrrhenian stakeholders suppose 525 
that the revenue decrease would be proportional to fishing time.  526 
All of these results show how important direct experimentation, pilot 527 
projects, and information sharing are to change fishers’ ideas about 528 
management schemes and how difficult it is for fishers to accept new 529 
proposals. 530 
The focus group, carried out with the participation of Italian fishery 531 
associations, has permitted the building of some simple pedagogical tools 532 
based on realistic figures obtained through surveys that can be used by 533 
stakeholders, in particular managers of associations, cooperatives, and 534 
producer organizations, to better understand the functioning and possible 535 
consequences of ITEs schemes. 536 
Some of the opinions on ITEs collected in the survey were confirmed by the 537 
models (e.g. small vessels could obtain rents with the introduction of ITEs), 538 
whereas others were rejected (e.g. quotas proportional to historic fishing 539 
days are better in order to avoid gratuitous rents for small vessels). In any 540 
case, this exercise has increased stakeholders’ knowledge about a 541 
management scheme that offers some advantages in the case of mixed 542 
fisheries. These advantages are particularly relevant in the case of bottom 543 
trawling fisheries, whereas, for pelagic fisheries that focus on only two 544 
species (sardine and anchovy), an ITQ scheme could also be applied 545 
(Mulazzani and Malorgio, 2013). 546 
In 2016, in conjunction with the realization of this study, the regulation for 547 
pelagic fisheries has changed again. For the Adriatic Sea, a limit of 144 fishing 548 
days (and a minimum of 70 days) has been imposed, with a maximum of 20 549 
days per month. This limit is less than the amount that an average pelagic 550 
trawler normally used to fish. Without an explicit announcement by the 551 
Italian management authority, the management scheme seems to have 552 
shifted toward non-transferable effort quotas, which does not exclude the 553 
possibility that private interests, driven by differences in marginal profits, will 554 
transform it in a transferable effort quota scheme. 555 
Several issues have to be considered in more depth in future analysis. 556 
Biological aspects have been completely ignored in this study. Biologists 557 
should have to identify the most suitable fishing day limits in the context of 558 
mixed fisheries, where the maximum sustainable yield cannot be achieved 559 
for every species. Difficult choices are required, balancing the needs of 560 
fishers and environment. The exchange of quotas between vessels may 561 
entail an increase in average catchability (i.e. efficiency), and, thus, further 562 
reductions in fishing days could be required over time (see appendix B). From 563 
an economic perspective, the advantages of vessels from one region over the 564 
vessels from other regions have not been considered in detail, but, in fact, 565 
the exchange of quotas between regions can affect local supply chains. 566 
Furthermore, as several stakeholders have highlighted, considering day 567 
restrictions without considering hours per day can be misleading, especially 568 
when fishing time patterns differ among regions. 569 
 570 
 571 
Appendix A – Static model 572 
In the scientific literature, there is a lack of formal treatment of ITEs. Clark 573 
(1980) builds a predictive model of fisheries management where, he says, 574 
‘quotas on catch are equivalent to quotas on fishing effort’, which trivially 575 
follows from the assumed direct relationship between catch and effort, 576 
Yi=qBEi, where B is the biomass of the fish stock, q is the catchability 577 
coefficient, and Y and E are, respectively, the catches and the fishing effort 578 
of vessel i. However, this direct relationship between effort and catches is 579 
true only if q is equal for every vessel. 580 
Danielsson (2002) and Ulrich et al. (2002) discuss the efficiency of total 581 
allowable effort quotas (TAEs), but they do not consider the case of ITEs. 582 
However, Ulrich et al. (2002) recognize that TAEs require a model of the 583 
catchability dynamics. As Squires et al. (2016) highlight, effort is less well 584 
defined and homogeneous as an input than catch is as an output; controlling 585 
a single dimension of effort (e.g. days) leaves out unregulated dimensions 586 
that can be expanded (‘capital stuffing’) and technological progress (‘effort 587 
creep’) that can increase catch (i.e. effective effort increases). In contrast to 588 
catch rights, ITEs do not create incentives to overcome biological overfishing 589 
and to minimize costs but rather create incentives to maximize revenue 590 
(Squires et al., 2016).  591 
For this work, we developed a model that takes into consideration 592 
differences between single vessels (Andersen et al., 2010; Clark, 1980). For 593 
every vessel, we consider the following Cobb-Douglas production function 594 
   (A.1)  595 
 596 
where Y is yearly catches; S is a measure of fishing capacity (e.g. GT or engine 597 
power); D is a measure of fishing activity (such as days at sea); B is the 598 
biomass of fish stocks; m is a technological parameter; and a, b, and g are 599 
other parameters that make the function non-linear, indicating increasing or 600 
𝑌 = 𝑚𝑆𝑎𝐷𝑏𝐵𝑔  1 
decreasing returns to inputs. Decreasing returns to inputs should be 601 
expected for S and D, even though the fishery literature includes empirical 602 
estimations where the elasticity is greater than one, indicating some sort of 603 
economies of scale (Bjorndal and Conrad, 1987; Eide et al., 1998). 604 
Profit is given by 605 
    (A.2)606 
  607 
where p is the price of fish, sSt are fixed costs, and xSyD are variable costs. 608 
Both fixed costs and variable costs are functions of the fishing capacity S. 609 
We stress that, all other coefficients constant, the effect on profit of 610 
increasing capacity S depends on the values of a, t, and y. In fact, if a>y and 611 
a>t, profit increases with S, and profit decreases otherwise. However, this 612 
result is certain only for infinitely high values of S; for values of S closer to 613 
reality, profits can increase also if a is lower than y and t. 614 
In the short term, profit depends only on days at sea D (we suppose there is 615 
no difference in the length of a fishing day). Let us assume that b<1, meaning 616 
that there are decreasing returns to fishing days. This assumption simply 617 
means that fishers always choose more rather than less suitable days for 618 
fishing. Vessel owners will decide to fish the number of days that maximize 619 
profit. Thus, from Equation A.2, we obtain that fishing days will be 620 
     (A.3) 621 
 622 
From this equation, it is possible to see if vessels of larger capacity S will tend 623 
to be active for more days or not. In fact, if a>y, D increases with S; if a<y, D 624 
decreases; and, finally, if a=y, S has no effect and all vessels choose the same 625 
number of days at sea. 626 
We can see in Figure A.1 some simulations of profit given different days at 627 
sea and different parameters a, y, and t. 628 
𝜋 = 𝑝(𝑚𝑆𝑎𝐷𝑏𝐵𝑔)−  𝑠𝑆𝑡 + 𝑥𝑆𝑦𝐷   1 








Appendix B – Long term equilibrium model 630 
The previous model is static and can represent the behaviour of vessels in 631 
the short term. In the long term, it is necessary to consider the dynamics of 632 
the fish stocks. In this section, we assume a simple logistic growth function, 633 
which permits us to calculate steady maximum sustainable yield (MSY), 634 
maximum economic yield (MEY), and bioeconomic equilibrium (BE). Given 635 
Equation A.3, changes in the sizes of stocks directly affect the number of days 636 
at sea chosen by fishers in order to maximize their profit (i.e. lower biomass 637 
implicates fewer days at sea). MSY, MEY, and BE are functions of the number 638 
(n) of vessels in the fishery and the capacity (S) of each vessel. Given n and S 639 
for each vessel, MSY or MEY can be obtained through management imposing 640 
a maximum number of days at sea (D) per vessel, since D chosen by single 641 
fishers to maximize their short-term profits cannot guarantee these yield 642 
levels. 643 
For simplicity, we have simulated a situation where there are n/2=60 large 644 
vessels (S=300) and n/2=60 small vessels (S=60) (Figure B.1). As expressed in 645 
the questionnaire to fishers, the management authority can choose between 646 
two options. It can decide to either establish equal fishing day limits for all 647 
vessels, or it can establish a fishing day limit that is proportional to the 648 
historic days at sea of each vessel. For example, if we consider the case 649 
shown in Figure A.1a as historical information, large vessels used to work 296 650 
days per year and small vessels 198 days per year, and, thus, the restriction 651 
should be applied proportionally. In Figure B.1a, steady profits7 (i.e. at 652 
equilibrium) are shown for small and large vessels for different levels of TAE. 653 
The total profit of the fleet as a whole does not change considerably across 654 
the two management strategies, but the distribution of the benefits between 655 
the two groups of vessels is very different. Large vessels, in particular, are 656 
negatively affected by equal fishing day limits. 657 
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 Steady solutions have been calculated simulating the dynamics of the fish stock for a 60-
year period until the equilibrium is obtained. 
The situation can change further if fishing days are transferable between 658 
vessels in an ITEs scheme. The exchange should happen when vessel owners 659 
have different marginal profits for the last fishing day they are allowed to 660 
use. With this management scheme, given a certain total number of fishing 661 
days for the fleet, the final distribution of fishing days between small and 662 
large vessels is not affected by the initial allocation of limits (i.e. equal for all 663 
or proportional to historical fishing days) since the exchange of quotas 664 
continues until all of the vessels have the same marginal profit. However, a 665 
higher concession of fishing days at the moment of the initial allocation can 666 
be converted into rents when the quota exchange occurs. In a situation as 667 
shown in Figure A.1a, large vessels tend to buy some fishing days from small 668 
vessels. 669 
Given a certain TAE, the total catches and profits of the fleet change if the 670 
distribution of days between vessels is determined by fixed (i.e. equal for all 671 
vessels) quotas, proportional quotas, or transferable quotas. Fixed quotas 672 
entail the lowest average catchability for the fleet, which means low short-673 
term efficiency. On the contrary, transferability permits the highest 674 
catchability or short-term efficiency for the fleet. However, this high 675 
efficiency also entails high exploitation of the fish stock, which affects the 676 
long-term potential of the fishery. In other words, in equilibrium (as shown 677 
in Figure B.1b), a transferable fishing days scheme can obtain the same 678 
catches or profits of a fixed days scheme only through a further reduction of 679 
the TAE. 680 
To avoid an increase in fishing mortality, a different approach is a 681 
management scheme that explicitly considers capacity to maintain a 682 
constant total effort of the fleet. Here, the choice is between an index of 683 
nominal effort and an index of effective effort (Figure B.2). 684 
In the first case, capacity*fishing day (S*D) could be easily applied and 685 
understood by fishers and authorities. The problem is that the nominal effort 686 
cannot perfectly reflect the ability of vessels to catch fish (i.e. effective effort 687 
or fishing mortality). In other words, assuming decreasing returns to capacity 688 
(i.e. a<1), a vessel A that is five times larger than a vessel B catches less than 689 
five times the catches of B. In this situation, also considering a relationship 690 
between variable costs and capacity that is favourable to large vessels (such 691 
as in Figure A.1a, where a>y), small vessels may have higher marginal profits 692 
than large vessels for the last unit of nominal effort (S*D) that they are 693 
allowed to use.  694 
Thus, ITEs based on indices of nominal effort may affect the long-term 695 
efficiency of the fishery as much or more than those based on transferable 696 
fishing days since less efficient vessels (the small ones) are artificially 697 
advantaged by the ITE scheme, leading to an increase in effective effort. 698 
ITEs based on indices of effective effort, on the contrary, are the only 699 
schemes where the average catchability of the fleet does not change due to 700 
the exchange of quotas between vessels of different sizes (i.e. in the short-701 
term, the total catches of the fleet do not change). In this way, vessels that 702 
are truly efficient, those that have the lowest marginal cost per unit of catch, 703 
or those that get the best prices (e.g. improving fish quality) can emerge and 704 
buy effort quotas (Figure B.2).  705 
The potential advantage of effective effort quotas, however, increases in the 706 
very long-term when, beyond the exchange (or leasing) of days at sea (i.e. 707 
activity) weighed in effort quota terms, firms may decide to exchange 708 
capacity, also weighted in effort quota terms. In other words (assuming 709 
parameters as in Figure A.1a), small vessels are retired and replaced by a 710 
smaller number of large vessels. In fact, assuming different efficiencies of 711 
vessels (i.e. different cost per unit of catch), less efficient vessels should, 712 
theoretically, be completely substituted by more efficient ones. This 713 
substitution would permit greater profits for the fleet at both the MSY and 714 
the MEY level. 715 
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